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Abstract 
The existence of a commodity market risk premium has attracted the interest of researchers for 
several decades.  Most attempts to measure risk premiums have been focused on futures markets.  
However, if the risk premium is a payment made by hedgers (as suggested by Keynes) to reduce 
their risk profile, then the risk being reduced originates in the cash market.  This suggests that the 
risk premium may also originate in the cash market.  As such, the search for a risk premium 
should focus on the cash market, and, given Working’s Supply of Storage Curve, should be 
measured as a function of stored inventory. This paper develops an expected utility based model 
that separates the risk premium from other storage incentives, and illustrates the role of the cash 
market risk premium on the storage decisions of two different market agents.  2
Risk Premiums and the Storage of Agricultural Commodities 
Introduction 
The search for a risk premium in agricultural commodity markets has attracted the 
interest of market researchers for decades.  Keynes (1930) first introduced the concept to explain 
speculative behavior in commodity futures markets.  Keynes assumed speculators were generally 
net long in futures, and hedgers net short.  He argued the risk premium was manifested by a 
downward bias in futures prices (called normal backwardation), meaning that prices for deferred 
delivery would be expected to rise as contracts approached expiration, ceterus paribus.  This rise 
in price represented the cost to hedgers of eliminating price risk over time, and the reward to 
futures speculators for accepting that risk.  Hardy (1940) challenged Keynes’ description of 
market dynamics arguing speculators receive no reward for accepting the risk passed on by 
hedgers.  In short, Hardy viewed the futures market as purely a game of chance for speculators.  
More recent research has suggested that risk premiums may be more complicated than first 
envisioned by Keynes, but the general concept remains controversial (Dusak (1973) and Carter, 
Rausser, and Schmitz (1983)).   
Parallel to searches for market risk premiums have been attempts to measure a 
convenience yield (Kaldor (1939), Working (1948, 1949), Brennan (1958), Telser (1958)).  A 
convenience yield exists if the potential costs of not having access to inventory at a future time 
are greater than the expected decline in inventory value.  In this instance, a risk-averse market 
agent would engage in storage even though the value of inventory is expected to deteriorate.  The 
concept of convenience yield explains the holding of inventories in inverted markets – markets 
where prices for immediate delivery are higher than prices for deferred delivery.   
Brennan combined the concepts of  risk premium and convenience yield in describing 
Working’s Supply of Storage Curve (Figure 1).  He used supply of storage to delineate where, in   3
the temporal price space, storage decisions are driven by risk premiums and where they 
aredriven by convenience yields.  In Brennan’s analysis, the incentive to hold additional 
inventory is dominated by a market risk premium when stocks are high.  At very low stock levels, 
the motivation for holding inventory is dominated by the convenience yield.  Consider a soybean 
processor.  Even if the market is rewarding soybean storage, the processor’s risk (or physical 
costs) increase significantly when a storage capacity constraint is reached.  To store additional 
inventory, the processor would need to either invest in additional storage space, or resort to non-
traditional storage strategies (for example, piling inventory on the ground).  This increases his 
risk profile, and he would demand a risk premium to increase storage.  At the other extreme, the 
processor may choose to store soybeans in an inverted market because the risk and associated 
costs of not having access to soybeans later could exceed the expected loss from storing beans.  
The cost of not having access to soybeans would be those costs associated with an idle plant.  If 
the costs of shutting the plant down exceed the costs associated with deteriorating inventory 
value, then even a risk averse soybean processor would choose to hold inventory in an inverted 
market. 
As an alternative to convenience yield, recent work has focused on marginal transaction 
cost to explain the holding of stocks (Chavas, Despins and Fortenbery (2000)). The convenience 
yield and the marginal transaction cost both describe the benefits of holding inventories in 
inverted markets.  Although they attempt to explain a similar phenomenon, the transaction cost 
concept has some advantages.  For one, unlike convenience yield, the marginal transaction cost 
is not necessarily related to production, thus it can be applied to a pure storage business.  Second, 
the convenience yield is not directly observable, but the transaction cost can be specified and 
separated from the risk premium. Because of this it may be more manageable to identify and   4
measure risk premiums and marginal transaction cost simultaneously, as opposed to trying to 
measure the convenience yield directly. 
Interestingly, empirical investigations of convenience yield have focused on both futures 
and cash markets, while the search for a risk premium has been dominated by a focus on futures 
markets.  But if there is a close relationship between the futures and cash markets (such a 
relationship has been documented in a large body of research – see Fortenbery and Zapata 
(1997)), then risky positions in cash markets should also be rewarded if a market risk premium 
exists.  If, as argued by Keynes, hedgers pay a risk premium to futures speculators in order to 
reduce price risk, then the risk is one which originates in the cash market, implying the risk 
premium may also be present in the cash market.  Further, if holders of inventory choose to forgo 
hedging, perhaps they are simply deciding to earn the risk premium directly in the cash market, 
rather than passing it to futures speculators in the form of a hedge (based on USDA (2003) data, 
it appears most on –farm storage is not hedged).   
Objectives 
To date the literature lacks a theoretical model that segregates storage incentives, and 
simultaneously measures their individual contributions to market agent behavior.  The objective 
of this paper is to measure risk premiums in the cash market, and to simultaneously deal with 
identifying the interaction between risk premiums and marginal transaction cost.  This is done 
for two different type cash market agents that hold inventory.  Using an expected utility 
framework, estimates of the specific impacts of both risk premiums and marginal transaction cost 
on storage decisions are evaluated.   The paper proceeds by defining the general storage problem, 
and introducing theoretical models of storage behavior.  Next, empirical results associated with 
estimation of the theoretical models are presented.  The implications of the research are then 
summarized in the conclusions section.    5
Defining the Problem 
The analysis here assumes two types of major market participants that engage in storage: 
crop growers, referred to as producers, and professional storage firms (e.g. commercial 
elevators),
1 referred to as commercials.  According to USDA’s January 2003 Stocks Reports, 
1,170 million bushels of soybeans were stored on-farm, and 944 million bushels were stored off-
farm at the end of 2002.  In addition, on and off-farm storage of corn totaled 4,800 and 2,838 
million bushels, respectively, and 580 million on-farm and 1,171 million off-farm bushels of 
wheat were held in storage.  This suggests that producers and commercials are both important in 
storing agricultural products.  Thus, in discussing the effect of storage on commodity prices, both 
on farm and off farm storage must be considered.   
Both producers and commercials are considered to be rational decision makers, and the 
purpose of their businesses is to maximize net income from sales (gross income is used 
synonymous with sales revenue). The costs incurred by producers include production costs (e.g., 
seed, fertilizer, irrigation, fuel, chemicals, and interest on operating costs), costs of storage, and 
costs spent to facilitate sales. Commercials do not face production costs, but other costs are 
similar to those borne by producers.  It is assumed that both producers and commercials are long 
term market participants.  Thus, their decisions regarding production and storage are based not 
only on current net income but also future income. That is, their decision making can be 
characterized as a multi-period optimization problem. 
Optimal On-Farm Storage 
The main business of agricultural producers is to grow crops.  Their profits come from 
the difference between their sales price and production costs.  Although some producers hedge in 
futures markets in order to reduce price risk, much of the literature on hedging (Helmuth (1977)), 
Berck (1981), Brorsen (1995)) indicates the percentage of primary producers who use futures to   6
hedge is very low. Thus, gains from hedging are assumed and hedging is not considered in the 
model for producers. 
In this economic framework, agricultural producers are assumed to only grow crops, and 
not invest in other markets. They also keep stocks for future sales. If yt, xt and qt denote a 
producer’s crop output, inventory level, and net sales at time t, then the relationship between two 
periods t and t-1 is characterized by: 
(1 - δ) xt-1 + yt = xt + qt.       (2.1) 
In other words, the total amount of agricultural product available in the current period includes 
the amount to be sold immediately and the amount to be stored for a future sale. Since the stored 
product is subject to deterioration over time a depreciation rate of inventory δ is included in the 
equation. This rate could depend on the technology that producers possess, and is assumed to be 
constant over time.   
When producers sell product, the net revenue they receive is not equal to the prevailing 
cash price. During the process of selling they incur inevitable expenses.  These include gathering 
market information on who the buyers are, negotiating with buyers, and transporting products to 
buyers’ places of business. All these expenses are called transaction cost, consistent with Chavas, 
Despins and Fortenbery (2000).  
If an entity is a large business, it may have more power when negotiating with buyers. In 
addition, the information gathering will be more efficient and average information costs will be 
less. On the other hand, when sellers want to sell more, they have to put more effort into finding 
sufficient buyers, thus increasing transaction costs. As a result, not only available product but 
also the sales activity impacts the transaction cost. This means transaction cost is a function of 
inventory level (xt) and sales (qt) since available product is a function of xt and qt. As such, transaction cost is assumed to be a varying proportion of the current cash price and has the 
following specification: 






















,   (2.2) 
where s is a constant and pt is the cash price.  
Following the sale of product profits are calculated by subtracting production costs and 
storage costs from revenue. The producers’ current period profits (πt) are then defined as: 
  πt = [pt – s(qt, xt)] qt – c1( yt) – c2( xt),      (2.3) 
where c1(yt) and c2(xt) are the cost functions for production and storage respectively. 
Producers maximize their utility of profits from production and storage.  Their decision is 
represented by the following optimization problem: 
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subject to equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), where Et is the expectation operator based on current 
available information, πt is current profit, U(πt) is the producers’ preference function that is 
assumed to be increasing and differentiable with respect to πt, and β is the time discount factor (0 
< β < 1).  In solving this problem it is assumed current net sales are positive (qt ≥ 0); that is, 
producers always sell but do not buy stocks. This results in transaction cost st (equation 2.2) 
always being non-negative.  Also assume that producers keep at least some inventory at all times 
(i.e., the amount of inventory level xt is positive). Based on this, the profit function πt, and thus 
the value function Jt(xt-1), are continuous and differentiable within their domains. 
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to qt and xt are:
2
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Recall from (2.1) and (2.3), 
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Substituting equations (2.6) and (2.7) into equation (2.5) yields: 
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          (2.8) 
From equation (2.2), we have 
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.        (2.10) 
By substituting equations (2.2), (2.9) and (2.10) into equation (2.8), the first-order condition 
becomes: 
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  8          (2.11) 
Equation 2.11 is the conceptual model used to derive the empirical results below.  It states that at 
optimal inventory levels, the discounted expected marginal value of storage equals the current 
marginal value of storage.  Re-arranging equation (2.8) results in the following arbitrage pricing 
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         (2.12) 
Equation (2.12) can be viewed as the optimal decision rule of producers. It states that the 
marginal benefit of storing (the left hand side of the equation) must equal the marginal cost (the 
right hand side of the equation) at the optimal storage level. The right hand side of equation (2.12) 



























































,     (2.14) 
and ∂c2/∂xt is the marginal cost of storing. 
  When there are no transaction costs during a sale, i.e. st = 0, MTCt will be zero.  Thus, it 
is reasonable to think of MTCt as the marginal transaction cost because it reflects how changes 
in stocks will affect transaction cost at the optimal storage level.  It should also be noted that 
when producers are risk neutral, i.e. ∂Ut/∂πt is constant during all periods, the covariance in 
  9equation (2.14) is zero, thus MRPt becomes zero.  Even though MRPt is irrelevant to the optimal 
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Otherwise, marginal risk preference ∂Ut/∂πt will differ over time and cause the covariance and 
MRPt to vary.  Thus, MRPt measures how producers’ risk preferences affect storage behavior. It 
is referred to as the marginal risk premium, but here it is measured in the cash market, not the 
futures market. 
From examination of equations (2.13) and (2.14), it is not clear whether the marginal 
transaction cost and marginal risk premium for each period are positive or negative. For MTCt, 
the first term in (2.13) is positive but the last three terms are all negative.
3  In the case of MRPt, 
the covariance in (2.14) could be either positive or negative depending on how changes in price 
and transaction cost change marginal utility at a specific time.  
Description of Data 
  Because there has typically been less U.S. government influence in soybean pricing 
relative to other storable commodities, soybeans are chosen as the commodity of interest. 
Empirical tests of the conceptual model above are based on quarterly data for the period 1986 
through 2002, 68 observations in total.  Quarterly data are used to coincide with the frequency of 
USDA Stocks Reports. 
  10
  The quarterly data for soybean cash prices, pt, were taken from Commodity Research 
Bureau (CRB) InfoTech Data. They represent cash prices in central Illinois. The data for 
production output yt and inventory levels xt are from the USDA Crop Production and Grain 
Stocks reports.  Crop Production reports the annual output for many agricultural products 
including soybeans. Because soybeans are usually harvested in the fourth calendar quarter, the 
annual production estimate was treated as the output level in the fourth quarter each year, with   11
the output in other quarters set to zero. The USDA’s Grain Stocks Report estimates on farm and 
off farm stocks for soybeans each quarter. The on farm stocks data were used as producers’ 
quarterly inventory levels, and off farm stocks data represents commercials’ inventory.  
  Soybean production cost data were taken from USDA-ERS. ERS gives annual average 
production cost per planted acre including operation costs and allocated overhead. Using USDA 
data, the average cost per bushel was calculated and then multiplied by production output to get 
the total production costs for each year. Because soybeans are planted and harvested during the 
last three quarters, the total production costs were divided equally into the last three quarters of 
each year, and represented by c1(yt). The first quarter’s production cost was set to zero. Storage 
costs were assumed to be 3 cents/bushel/month (or 9 cents/bushel/quarter). This is consistent 
with recommendations from the Professional Education for Farmers of Iowa Farm Bureau 
Federation (2002).  The depreciation rate δ  in equation (2.1) was assumed to be 0.03 (this is 
consistent with Chavas, Despins and Fortenbery (2000)).  The data are summarized in Table 1. 
Estimation and Empirical Results for Producers 
In order to estimate the conceptual model, one needs to specify a utility function.  The 
producers’ utility function is assumed to be an increasing function, implying the marginal utility 
function is positive, i.e., U’(πt) > 0.  It is also assumed that producers can be risk neutral, risk 
averse, or even risk seeking. Each of these could be true under some circumstances. Research by 
Pennings and Smidts (2003) found that utility functions can be S-shaped, or fully concave or 
convex among decision makers.  Also, since producers are doing business in risky markets, it is 
possible that profits can negative.  Therefore, the utility function should be able to accept non-
positive values as its arguments.  For the reasons above a quadratic marginal utility function with 
the following specification was adopted: 
U’(πt) = EXP(aπt+bπt
2).           12
This specification is similar to the utility function proposed by Chavas and Holt (1996). With this 
specification, it is guaranteed that marginal utility is always non-negative regardless of whether 
πt is positive or negative. Thus, the assumption of non-decreasing utility is not violated. Also, 
this utility specification has the advantage of accommodating many possibilities of risk 
preference: (1) risk neutral: a = 0 and b = 0; (2) risk averse: a < 0 and b = 0; (3) risk seeking: a 
> 0 and b = 0;  (4) S-shaped (risk seeking for small profits and risk averse for large profits): b < 
0; and  (5) reversed S-shaped: b > 0. 
  Note that equation (2.11) is a nonlinear specification and the probability distribution of its 
error term is unknown. The Hansen’s generalized method of moments (GMM) does not require 
full knowledge of the model’s probability distribution, and only demands the specification of a 
set of moment conditions that the model should satisfy (Hansen (1982), Hansen and Singleton 
(1982), and Harris and Mátyás (1999)). Therefore, equation (2.11) was estimated with iterative 
non-linear GMM.  
The instruments selected for GMM estimation are required to be uncorrelated with the 
error term.  Instruments for GMM estimation are selected based on the criteria that estimated 
parameters be significant and the J-statistic of the model be small.  Several instruments were 
tested.  The final instruments chosen were the producer price index (PPI), a time variable that has 
the value of 1 through 68, and lagged one through four periods’ value of the cash prices, i.e. pt-1, 
pt-2, pt-3 and pt-4, for a total of 7 instruments including a constant.
4  
The empirical results of equation (2.11) are presented in Table 2. The low J-statistic 
indicates that the model is specified correctly. The estimated parameter s is significantly different 
from zero at the one percent level, providing evidence that the transaction cost is indeed a very 
important element influencing producers’ storage decisions. The significance of b indicates that 
producers are not risk neutral, and that marginal risk premiums may exist in the cash market for   13
producers. Although the parameter a is not significantly different from zero, this parameter is 
still kept in the model to maintain the original specification for the marginal utility function.
5
The estimates of parameters a and b were both positive. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion (ar) is measured as 
  ar = - U’’/U’ = - (a+2bπt) EXP(aπt+bπt
2) / EXP(aπt+bπt
2) = - (a+2bπt). 
Risk averse behavior corresponds to ar > 0 and risk seeking behavior to ar < 0. Hence, the 
empirical results indicate that producers exhibit risk seeking behavior (i.e. ar < 0) when they 
have profits and risk averse behavior (i.e. ar > 0) when they incur a large loss (when πt < -11.94).  
According to ERS’s soybean production costs and returns report, during the period 1986-2002 
the economic returns from soybean production were positive in six years and negative in the 
other eleven years. Therefore, even if returns to storage are included, we should expect to see 
risk averse behavior in some years and risk seeking in others. Following Pratt (1964), producers’ 
risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) because ∂ar/∂πt = - 2b < 0. 
  After estimating the model, the marginal risk premium MRPt and marginal transaction 
cost MTCt were calculated for each period by applying equations (2.13) and (2.14), and then the 
average of each were calculated. The expectation and covariance terms in these two equations 
were simulated using bootstrap techniques. The random variable pt in equation (2.3) was fitted 
by an autoregressive time-series model. Results indicated that an AR(2) was the most appropriate 
model for pt: 
 p t =  586.5673 - 0.9894 pt-1 + 0.1741 pt-4.     (2.15) 
                   (19.77)       (14.99)          (2.57) 
Asymptotic t values are presented in parentheses below the corresponding parameters. The 
residuals εt can be calculated from the above empirical model. For each time t, 1000 values of pt 
were simulated and substituted into equation (2.3) to calculate the profits πt.  This involved two 
steps.  First, for each period t = i, εi
* was drawn randomly from the empirical distribution of the residuals {ε1, …, εT}.  Second, the selected residuals were added to the estimated pi to produce 
the simulated future price pi
*.  This procedure was then repeated 1000 times. The resulting values 
of πt were used to generate the marginal utilities U’t. The values of (st + qt ∂st/∂qt) and (pt - st - qt 
∂st/∂qt) were also calculated by using the simulated values of pt. Finally, the average of U’t and 
(st + qt ∂st/∂qt), and the sample covariance between U’t and (pt - st - qt ∂st/∂qt) were obtained and 
used in equations (2.13) and (2.14) to get the values of the marginal risk premium and marginal 
transaction cost for each period. 
The estimated marginal risk premium and marginal transaction cost (in cents per bushel) 
are reported in Table 3.  The marginal risk premium is found to be significantly non-zero.  This 
indicates producers earn marginal risk premiums in the cash market by holding stocks, although 
the marginal risk premium is not large compared to the average cash price of 595 cents per 
bushel.  The average marginal risk premium is only 0.28% of the average cash price. The 
marginal transaction cost is negative and also statistically significant. Its average is 14.52% of 
the average cash price. This suggests producers reduce their transaction cost by keeping stocks.  
The marginal risk premium measures how much the risk premium itself will increase by 
holding more inventory, while the risk premium measures the producers’ willingness to pay in 
order to eliminate future profit risk.  Denote the Arrow-Pratt risk premium as RP. Following 
Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964), the risk premium at each time t can be measured based on the 
following equation: 
  EU(πt) = U(E(πt) – RPt), 
where E is the expectation operator. The above equation can also be written in the following way 
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left hand side of equation (2.16). The simulated values of the estimated parameters a and b were 
substituted into (2.16) to solve for the risk premium RPt in each time period.  
The transaction cost also affects producers’ profits. In order to compare the effects of risk 
premiums and transaction cost on profits, the total transaction cost, TCt, in each period was 
calculated as the unit transaction cost times sales. Based on equation (2.2), this is written as: 
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where st(.) is the unit transaction cost.  The results for RPt and TCt (in billion cents) are reported 
in Table 4. 
The risk premiums are not always positive, indicating that producers are not always risk 
averse. This result is consistent with the fact that the estimated parameters a and b are positive, 
and thus producers are risk averse only when they incur a loss. When producers can obtain 
profits from soybean production and storage, they are risk seeking and willing to pay to bear risk. 
It can be seen from the estimation results that the risk premium and the transaction cost have 
similar effects on producers’ final profits. On average, they are between 15% and 20% of the 
expected profits. 
Optimal Commercial Storage 
  15
In addition to agricultural producers, merchandisers maintain agricultural stocks for 
future trade.  Commercials purchase commodities from producers, but usually do not consume 
the commodities themselves. Their main business is to store commodities and sell them to 
processors and wholesalers.
6  Some of the commodities are sold immediately and some are stored for extended times. Commercials’ profits come from the price difference between the time 
of purchase and sale. In order to avoid risk, they may hedge some of their inventory in the 
futures market. 
Commercials maximize their utility of profits, and their decision is represented by the 
following optimization problem: 
{} 11 1 ,, (,) m a x ( ) m a x( ) ( , )
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subject to (1) πt = [pt – st] qt – c(xt) + (pt – ft-1) ξt-1,    (3.1) 
     (2) (1 - δ) xt-1 – qt = xt,        (3.2) 
where ft is the price of a futures contract and ξt is the amount of the inventory to be hedged in the 
futures market.  For commercials, the net sales, qt, can be positive or negative depending on 
whether they are increasing or decreasing inventories in a given period. 
  Like producers, commercials incur transaction costs when they buy commodities from 
growers.  Some of the transportation and information costs are passed to sellers (i.e., producers), 
but the rest is incurred by commercials. When commercials sell inventory, the cost of trading is 
shared between the commercials and the buyers.  Thus, transaction costs are incurred by 
commercials whether they buy or sell stocks.  Like producers, it is assumed that the transaction 
cost for commercials is a function of inventory level (xt) and net sales (qt).  But according to 
equation (3.2), qt is a function of xt-1 and xt.  Therefore, transaction cost st is actually a function 
of inventory levels xt-1 and xt: 
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,   (3.3) 
where s is a constant.  Since net sales qt can be negative, the transaction cost can also be negative. 
Because the inventory of last period, xt-1, is positive (assuming commercials don’t deplete their 
inventory), the sign of st depends on qt. There will be no transaction cost if there are no sales. 
  16When commercials sell stocks (qt > 0), the transaction cost st is positive, i.e., the real revenue 
received by commercials per unit of sale is the cash price less transaction cost.  When 
commercials buy stocks (qt < 0), the real expense paid by commercials is the cash price plus 
transaction costs. 
Solving the commercials’ optimization problem yields the following first order 
































































.    (3.4) 
The transaction cost function (3.3) can be discontinuous or non-differentiable only at the 
point that qt + xt = 0. But it is already assumed that the inventory level xt-1 is never non-positive. 
As a result, the transaction cost function st(xt-1,xt) is by assumption continuous and differentiable 
everywhere regardless of inventory or net sales, as is the value function Jt(xt-1,ξt-1). Applying the 
Envelop Theorem to the commercials’ optimization problem yields 
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Calculating the derivatives of st with respect to xt-1 and xt based on equation (3.3) and plugging 
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The above two-equation system is re-arranged to get the following econometric model which can 
be estimated with non-linear GMM: 
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From the first equation in (3.5) we can obtain the following arbitrage pricing equation 
reflecting the relationship between the prices in two periods: 






























































































































































































































.    (3.7) 
Description of Data 
  18  19
  As in the case of producers, quarterly soybean data from 1986 through 2002 are used to 
test the commercials’ storage model.  The quarterly data for the soybean cash and futures prices, 
pt and  ft, are taken from CRB InfoTech Data. The data for inventory level xt are taken from 
USDA’s quarterly Grain Stocks Report. Assuming commercials use the same technology as 
producers to store products, the storage cost is also 3 cents/bushel/month.  The commercials’ 
positions in the futures market, ξt, were simulated from the Commitments of Traders Report 
(COT), released by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In this report, long and short 
positions for commercial traders are reported. It was assumed that among commercial traders, 
holders of inventory only take short positions when they hedge in the futures market,
7 and their 
customers only take long positions. Therefore, ξt was approximated by the short-side commercial 
positions reported in the COT, and is always negative. 
Since commercials use futures markets mostly for the purpose of protecting storage 
against adverse price changes, they seldom deliver the commodities to the buyers of futures 
contracts.  As such, it was assumed that commercials are short-term hedgers and that they are 
continuously active in the futures market. The following simple hedging strategy was 
constructed for commercials: in the first quarter of each year, they short the July contract and 
offset hedges that were placed in the earlier March contract.  In the second quarter, they short the 
September contract and offset positions placed in the July contract.  In the third quarter, they 
short the January contract and offset positions in the September contract.  Finally, in the fourth 
quarter they short the March contract and offset the September contract hedges.  A summary of 
the commercials’ data is presented Table 5. 
Empirical Results for Commercials   20
The commercials’ marginal utility function was assumed to have the following 
specification: U’(πt) = Exp(aπt+bπt
2). The constant depreciation rate δ was also chosen to be 
0.03 in each quarter.  
The two-equation system (3.5) was estimated with iterative non-linear GMM. Similar to 
the instruments chosen for the producers’ model, seven instruments were chosen for the 
commercials’ model; namely a constant, the producer price index (PPI), a time trend variable, 
and lagged one through four periods’ value of the cash prices.
8
The results from equation (3.5) are reported in Table 6.  The p-value of the J-statistic 
indicates the model is correctly specified. The estimated parameter s is significantly different 
from zero at the one percent level, implying that the transaction cost impacts on the 
commercials’ storage decision. The possibility of marginal risk premiums is indicated by the 
significance of parameters a and b. Note that the estimates of parameters a and b are both 
negative. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion ar is measured as 
  ar = - U’’/U’ =  - (a+2bπt) > 0, 
indicating commercials are risk averse. Commercials’ risk preference exhibits increasing 
absolute risk aversion (IARA) because ∂ar/∂πt = - 2b > 0. 
Next, the estimated parameters were plugged in equations (3.6) and (3.7) to calculate the 
marginal risk premium and the marginal transaction cost. As in the case of producers, the 
expectation and covariance terms in (3.6) and (3.7) were simulated using bootstrap techniques. 
Since the random variable here is also the cash price pt, the same AR(2) model from equation 
(2.15) was used in the simulation process. 
The statistics of MRPt and MTCt (in cents per bushel) for commercials are reported in 
Table 7. The average marginal risk premium and the average marginal transaction cost are 
0.951% and 3.355% of average cash price, respectively. The marginal risk premium is found to   21
be significant and positive, which implies commercials earn a marginal risk premium from 
holding stocks. However, notice that the marginal risk premium of commercials is larger than 
that of producers. This means producers require less risk premium compensation for bearing the 
risk of storage.  
The marginal transaction cost for commercials is also significant. As in the case of 
producers, commercials benefit from storage by reducing their transaction cost associated with 
selling inventory.  However, the marginal transaction cost for commercials is smaller than that of 
producers. This may be because individual commercials generally hold larger inventories than 
producers.  If there are economies of scale in storage the average transaction cost of commercials 
is lower than that of producers.  This, in turn, would result in a smaller transaction cost savings 
per unit as a result of maintaining inventory. 
Table 8 presents the calculated risk premium and transaction cost values for commercials.  
These were calculated in the same manner as the producers’ values.  The risk premium is 
positive, indicating that commercials are risk averse. Commercials are willing to pay 8.98% of 
expected profits to avoid the price risk associated with storage.  Unlike producers, the risk 
premium for commercials is large (about 17% of expected profits), and the transaction cost is 
small. This suggests that the transaction cost is not as important a component of commercials’ 
final profits as it is for producers. 
Marginal Risk Premium, Marginal Transaction Cost and Inventory 
  The storage behavior of producers and commercials has been discussed above. In both 
cases, average marginal risk premiums are positive and significant, and average marginal 
transaction costs are negative and significant.  Thus, both producers and commercials earn 
marginal risk premiums and reduce marginal transaction costs by engaging in storage. The next 
step is to examine how inventory levels and marginal risk premiums relate to each other.   22
   The marginal risk premiums measure how much the cash market would pay a firm to 
engage in storage.  Figures 2 and 3 provide plots of the calculated MRPt against inventory levels 
for producers and commercials, respectively.  Note that MRPt increases at an increasing rate as xt 
increases. For both producers and commercials, the marginal risk premiums in most periods are 
positive, and when there are large inventories, the marginal risk premiums are all positive. This 
finding is consistent with the Supply of Storage Curve (Figure 1).  
The results are intuitively appealing.  By storing inventories for future sale, a storage firm 
bears price risk.  The positive marginal risk premiums represent compensation to the firm for 
absorbing the risk of storage.  The larger the inventory held in storage, the greater the price risk 
faced by a firm.  Even small unexpected price reductions could lead to huge losses and threaten a 
firm’s existence. Although a firm may be able to obtain financial help from banks or other 
sources to facilitate cash flow when it encounters large losses, the average cost of financing 
could still be much larger than in normal times. Therefore, as a firm’s inventory increases, the 
marginal risk premium should also increase commensurate with the increased risk. That is, 
∂MRPt/∂xt > 0 and ∂
2MRPt/∂xt
2 ≥ 0.  This is consistent with the mapping in Figures 2 and 3. 
On the other hand, when inventories are low, marginal risk premiums can be negative and 
marginal transaction cost tends to be negative and large. Thus, firms can benefit from storage 
even though the inventory will lose value over the storage period.  However, while marginal risk 
premiums can be negative, and marginal transaction costs are negative at low inventory levels, 
they are not measuring the same thing.  Marginal transaction cost measures the reduction of a 
firm’s costs of trading inventory, while marginal risk premiums reflect risk preferences.  The 
finding of negative marginal risk premiums is consistent with Chavas (1988), who also found 
that marginal risk premiums can be negative.  The results here, as well as Chavaz (1988), suggest 
Brennan’s assumption of non-negative marginal risk premiums was overly restrictive.       23
  The effects of the marginal risk premium and marginal transaction cost combined 
determine the overall net costs (or benefits) of storage. At low inventory levels, the marginal 
transaction cost dominates (and the marginal risk premium may be negative), leading to a 
negative cost of storage; that is, storage provides benefits but the market exhibits inverse 
carrying charges. At high levels of inventory, the marginal risk premium dominates, and we have 
a positive net cost of storage. 
Conclusions 
  The marginal risk premiums for holders of inventory in commodity markets were found 
to be significant, and the average of marginal risk premiums positive.  This suggests that 
marginal risk premiums do provide incentives for firms to hold inventories. The marginal 
transaction costs were also significant but the average was negative, implying that stockholding 
can provide benefits to firms by reducing transaction costs. The marginal risk premium and 
marginal transaction cost, together with the storage cost, determine how much the future cash 
price of commodities will differ from the current price. 
  A risk premium, calculated from the marginal risk premiums, was found to exist in the 
soybean market. The existence of a risk premium is due to the price uncertainty in the market, 
and gives storage businesses the incentive to store commodities. Without this compensation, 
fewer inventories would generally be held.  It was also found that the risk premium is an 
important factor determining the final profits of both producers and commercials.  In contrast, 
the transaction cost was found to affect producers’ expected profits significantly, but the impact 
on commercials was substantially less.  This may be due to the relative size of commercials, and 
associated with economies of scale in market transaction costs. 
  Previous studies (e.g. Dusak (1973), Deaves and Krinsky (1995), Telser (1958)) have 
claimed there is no risk premium in commodity markets. However, they were actually measuring   24
the marginal risk premium, not the risk premium itself.  The risk premium measures willingness 
to pay in order to eliminate risk, while the marginal risk premium measures changes in the risk 
premium.  Although the risk premium is positive for risk-averse agents, the marginal risk 
premium may not always be positive.  The marginal risk premium is a component in temporal 
price differences, but the risk premium is not.  If we only look at average of marginal risk 
premiums, we may conclude they do not exist as a result of averaging negative and positive 
numbers.  Also, if we assume, as Brennan did, that marginal risk premiums can only be positive 
we would not be able to accurately measure the risk premium itself.  
  This paper has identified and measured a market risk premium in the cash market for 
soybeans, and separated that from transaction cost storage incentives.  Further research is needed 
on how or if the cash market risk premium is transferred by hedgers to the futures market, and 
whether futures market speculators with relatively short investment horizons do in fact earn a 
risk premium.  This is the focus of current work.   25
Table 1: Summary of the data for the producer’s model 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Variable       Mean       Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Soybean cash prices (cents/bushel): 
  pt    585.13   104.75   421.35     839.52 
 
Soybean production output (1,000 bushels): 
yt    571,418.60 1,016,938.50  1,548,841*     2,890,682 
  
Producers’ inventory levels (1,000 bushels): 
  xt    488,998.51      345,155.84       43,600    1,240,000 
 
Production costs (1,000 cents): 
  c1(yt)   338,953,625  211,418,831   316,879,528*   591,872,742 
____________________________________________________________ 
  Note: Data period is 1986-2002, quarterly, 68 observations. 
  * Minimum of non-zero values 
 
 
Table 2: Parameter estimate for equation (2.11) 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Parameter         Estimate     Approx. Std. Error      t Value 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
       β                0.8707            0.0668                13.03* 
       s                  0.3898            0.0972                     4.01* 
       a                 8.55E-5          2.8E-4                     0.31 
       b                  3.58E-6          2.2E-6                     1.65** 
 
  Summary of fit: 
  standard  deviation  of the error term = 96.25 
J-statistic = 0.8915, p-value = 0.8275 
ITGMM iteration = 4 
____________________________________________________________ 
  * Statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
  Study Period: 1986-2002. 
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Table 3: Estimate of marginal risk premium and marginal transaction cost 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Variable      Mean             Standard Error 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
    MRPt         1.65               0.14 
    MTCt                        -86.41             11.96 
____________________________________________________________ 
  Number of observations = 66; Data Period: 1986-2002, quarterly. 
 
Table 4: Estimate of risk premium and transaction cost for producers 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Variable       Mean       Std. Error  Minimum  Maximum 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    RPt    12.97       4.94    -49.457     96.417 
RPt/E(πt)  15.31%     1.45%     1.28%     94.68% 
    TCt    31.04       1.19       9.363     55.613 
TCt/E(πt)  18.56%     3.29%     2.86%            218.38% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Number of observations = 67; data period: 1986-2002, quarterly. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the data for the storer’s model 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Variable       Mean       Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Soybean cash prices (cents/bushel): 
  pt   585.13   104.75   421.35   839.52 
 
Soybean futures prices (cents/bushel): 
  ft   599.29   98.83   434.27   867.34 
  
Commercials’ inventory levels (1,000 bushels): 
  xt    529,776.72      296,554.41       88,233  1,116,156 
 
Commercials’ positions in futures market (1,000 bushels): 
ξt    -288,039.62      160,356.65     -612,558.28  -75,428.01 
____________________________________________________________ 
  Note: Data period is 1986-2002, quarterly, 68 observations. 
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Table 6: Parameter estimate for equation (3.5) 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Parameter         Estimate     Approx. Std. Error      t Value 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
      β           0.9922           0.0097         102.15* 
      s           4.84E-3           0.0014                       3.39* 
      a                         -5.16E-4           0.0002                     -2.18** 
      b                           -1.70E-6           6.5E-7                     -2.63** 
 
  Summary of overall fit: 
 
std. dev. of the error term for first equation = 53.12 
std. dev. of the error term for second equation = 42.64 
J-statistic = 9.7067, p-value = 0.4666 
ITGMM iteration = 19 
____________________________________________________________ 
  * Statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
  Study Period: 1986-2002. 
 
Table 7: Estimate of marginal risk premium and marginal transaction cost 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Parameter           Mean           Standard Error 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
    MRPt        5.66           1.66 
    MTCt                        -19.96                   7.86 
____________________________________________________________ 
  Number of observations = 66; Data Period: 1986-2002, quarterly. 
 
Table 8: Estimate of risk premium and transaction cost for commercials 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Variable       Mean       Std. Error  Minimum  Maximum 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    RPt    17.08       1.28    10.1347  45.1593 
RPt/E(πt)    8.98%     0.62%    5.03%  44.21% 
    TCt      0.83       0.14      0.017        5.835 
TCt/E(πt)           0.83%          0.26%    0.01%            13.54% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 





st: inventory level 
m't: net marginal cost of storage 
r't: marginal risk premium 
c't: convenience yield 
Source: Brennan (1958), Figure 2. 
-c't 
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End Notes 
 
1 Food processors may also store agricultural commodities. To simplify the analysis, they are not 
separated from storage firms. 
2 Assume the second-order conditions hold for this optimization problem. 
3 Based on (2.9) and (2.10), ∂s/∂q is positive and ∂s/∂x negative. We also know the transaction 
cost st and sale qt are both positive. 
4 There are seven instruments and one target equation; hence, seven moment conditions are 
present. 
5 Even if parameter a is removed from the marginal utility function, i.e. U’(πt) = EXP(bπt
2), the 
estimates for other parameters are not changed qualitatively.  These results are available from the 
authors. 
6 Much of the off-farm storage could be held by processors. But the main business of processors 
is not storing commodities and processors’ overall operation costs are unknown. Also, the data 
for processors’ inventory are not available. Hence, it is assumed that all the off-farm storage is 
held by commercials. As a result, the benefits of storage to the processing business are not 
discussed. 
7 Commercials may also hedge their future purchases, i.e., take long positions in future markets. 
It would be desirable to separate commercials’ long position from other traders’. Unfortunately, 
such data are unavailable.  
8 There are two target equations and seven instruments; hence, fourteen moment conditions are 
present. 